| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix freeze UAF in binder_release_work()
When a binder reference is cleaned up, any freeze work queued in the
associated process should also be removed. Otherwise, the reference is
freed while its ref->freeze.work is still queued in proc->work leading
to a use-after-free issue as shown by the following KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_release_work+0x398/0x3d0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff31600ee91488 by task kworker/5:1/211
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 211 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-00382-gfc6c92196396 #22
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: events binder_deferred_func
Call trace:
binder_release_work+0x398/0x3d0
binder_deferred_func+0xb60/0x109c
process_one_work+0x51c/0xbd4
worker_thread+0x608/0xee8
Allocated by task 703:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x130/0x280
binder_thread_write+0xdb4/0x42a0
binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x25ac
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x254
Freed by task 211:
kfree+0xc4/0x230
binder_deferred_func+0xae8/0x109c
process_one_work+0x51c/0xbd4
worker_thread+0x608/0xee8
==================================================================
This commit fixes the issue by ensuring any queued freeze work is removed
when cleaning up a binder reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix memleak of proc->delivered_freeze
If a freeze notification is cleared with BC_CLEAR_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION
before calling binder_freeze_notification_done(), then it is detached
from its reference (e.g. ref->freeze) but the work remains queued in
proc->delivered_freeze. This leads to a memory leak when the process
exits as any pending entries in proc->delivered_freeze are not freed:
unreferenced object 0xffff38e8cfa36180 (size 64):
comm "binder-util", pid 655, jiffies 4294936641
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
b8 e9 9e c8 e8 38 ff ff b8 e9 9e c8 e8 38 ff ff .....8.......8..
0b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3c 1f 4b 00 00 00 00 00 ........<.K.....
backtrace (crc 95983b32):
[<000000000d0582cf>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<000000009c99a513>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x208/0x280
[<00000000313b1704>] binder_thread_write+0xdec/0x439c
[<000000000cbd33bb>] binder_ioctl+0x1b68/0x22cc
[<000000002bbedeeb>] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
[<00000000b439adee>] invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x254
[<00000000173558fc>] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x230
[<0000000084f72311>] do_el0_svc+0x40/0x58
[<000000008b872457>] el0_svc+0x38/0x78
[<00000000ee778653>] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
[<00000000a8ec61bf>] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
This patch fixes the leak by ensuring that any pending entries in
proc->delivered_freeze are freed during binder_deferred_release(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix use-after-free in ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup()
During ath12k module removal, in ath12k_core_deinit(),
ath12k_mac_destroy() un-registers ah->hw from mac80211 and frees
the ah->hw as well as all the ar's in it. After this
ath12k_core_soc_destroy()-> ath12k_dp_free()-> ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup()
tries to access one of the freed ar's from pending skb.
This is because during mac destroy, driver failed to flush few
data packets, which were accessed later in ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup()
and freed, but using ar from the packet led to this use-after-free.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888150bd3514 by task modprobe/8926
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8926 Comm: modprobe Not tainted
6.11.0-rc2-wt-ath+ #1746
Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS
HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xe0
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x33/0x3a0
print_report+0xb5/0x260
? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x24/0x80
kasan_report+0xd8/0x110
? ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
? ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0
__kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
ath12k_dp_cc_cleanup.part.0+0x5e2/0xd40 [ath12k]
ath12k_dp_free+0x178/0x420 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_stop+0x176/0x200 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_deinit+0x13f/0x210 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_remove+0xad/0x1c0 [ath12k]
pci_device_remove+0x9b/0x1b0
device_remove+0xbf/0x150
device_release_driver_internal+0x3c3/0x580
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
driver_detach+0xc4/0x190
bus_remove_driver+0x130/0x2a0
driver_unregister+0x68/0x90
pci_unregister_driver+0x24/0x240
? find_module_all+0x13e/0x1e0
ath12k_pci_exit+0x10/0x20 [ath12k]
__do_sys_delete_module+0x32c/0x580
? module_flags+0x2f0/0x2f0
? kmem_cache_free+0xf0/0x410
? __fput+0x56f/0xab0
? __fput+0x56f/0xab0
? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x4f/0x70
x64_sys_call+0x522/0x9f0
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x130
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f8182c6ac8b
Commit 24de1b7b231c ("wifi: ath12k: fix flush failure in recovery
scenarios") added the change to decrement the pending packets count
in case of recovery which make sense as ah->hw as well all
ar's in it are intact during recovery, but during core deinit there
is no use in decrementing packets count or waking up the empty waitq
as the module is going to be removed also ar's from pending skb's
can't be used and the packets should just be released back.
To fix this, avoid accessing ar from skb->cb when driver is being
unregistered.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.1.1-00214-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/s390: Implement blocking domain
This fixes a crash when surprise hot-unplugging a PCI device. This crash
happens because during hot-unplug __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail()
attaching the default domain fails when the platform no longer
recognizes the device as it has already been removed and we end up with
a NULL domain pointer and UAF. This is exactly the case referred to in
the second comment in __iommu_device_set_domain() and just as stated
there if we can instead attach the blocking domain the UAF is prevented
as this can handle the already removed device. Implement the blocking
domain to use this handling. With this change, the crash is fixed but
we still hit a warning attempting to change DMA ownership on a blocked
device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix NULL pointer in comp_algorithm_show()
LTP reported a NULL pointer dereference as followed:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 5995 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
lr : zcomp_available_show+0x60/0x100 [zram]
sp : ffff800088b93b90
x29: ffff800088b93b90 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000400cc0
x26: 0000000000000ffe x25: ffff80007b3e2388 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff80007b3e2390 x22: ffff0004041a9000 x21: ffff80007b3e2900
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80007b3e2900 x9 : ffff80007b3cb280
x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00656c722d6f7a6c
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff80007b3e2900 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
__pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
comp_algorithm_show+0x40/0x70 [zram]
dev_attr_show+0x28/0x80
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x90/0x140
kernfs_seq_show+0x34/0x48
seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8
kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x40/0x58
new_sync_read+0x9c/0x168
vfs_read+0x1a8/0x1f8
ksys_read+0x74/0x108
__arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x38/0x138
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190
The zram->comp_algs[ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP] can be NULL in zram_add() if
comp_algorithm_set() has not been called. User can access the zram device
by sysfs after device_add_disk(), so there is a time window to trigger the
NULL pointer dereference. Move it ahead device_add_disk() to make sure
when user can access the zram device, it is ready. comp_algorithm_set()
is protected by zram->init_lock in other places and no such problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread
In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following
stack trace:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0
? __die_body+0x26/0xa0
? die_addr+0x54/0x90
? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390
f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110
f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0
f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0
__f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0
f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0
vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0
x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540
do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from
different f2fs shutdown paths:
[CPU0] [CPU1]
---------------------- -----------------------
f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread
gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
gc_th = sbi->gc_thread
kfree(gc_th)
sbi->gc_thread = NULL
< gc_th != NULL >
kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF
The commit c7f114d864ac ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in
f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read
semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but
it fails to prevent all race conditions.
Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: realtek: usb: fix NULL deref in rtk_usb2phy_probe
In rtk_usb2phy_probe() devm_kzalloc() may return NULL
but this returned value is not checked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: realtek: usb: fix NULL deref in rtk_usb3phy_probe
In rtk_usb3phy_probe() devm_kzalloc() may return NULL
but this returned value is not checked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "block, bfq: merge bfq_release_process_ref() into bfq_put_cooperator()"
This reverts commit bc3b1e9e7c50e1de0f573eea3871db61dd4787de.
The bic is associated with sync_bfqq, and bfq_release_process_ref cannot
be put into bfq_put_cooperator.
kasan report:
[ 400.347277] ==================================================================
[ 400.347287] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bic_set_bfqq+0x200/0x230
[ 400.347420] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88881cab7d60 by task dockerd/5800
[ 400.347430]
[ 400.347436] CPU: 24 UID: 0 PID: 5800 Comm: dockerd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.12.0 #32
[ 400.347450] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[ 400.347454] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.20192059.B64.2207280713 07/28/2022
[ 400.347460] Call Trace:
[ 400.347464] <TASK>
[ 400.347468] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 400.347490] print_report+0x174/0x505
[ 400.347521] kasan_report+0xe0/0x160
[ 400.347541] bic_set_bfqq+0x200/0x230
[ 400.347549] bfq_bic_update_cgroup+0x419/0x740
[ 400.347560] bfq_bio_merge+0x133/0x320
[ 400.347584] blk_mq_submit_bio+0x1761/0x1e20
[ 400.347625] __submit_bio+0x28b/0x7b0
[ 400.347664] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x6b2/0xd30
[ 400.347690] iomap_readahead+0x50c/0x680
[ 400.347731] read_pages+0x17f/0x9c0
[ 400.347785] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x366/0x4a0
[ 400.347795] filemap_fault+0x83d/0x2340
[ 400.347819] __xfs_filemap_fault+0x11a/0x7d0 [xfs]
[ 400.349256] __do_fault+0xf1/0x610
[ 400.349270] do_fault+0x977/0x11a0
[ 400.349281] __handle_mm_fault+0x5d1/0x850
[ 400.349314] handle_mm_fault+0x1f8/0x560
[ 400.349324] do_user_addr_fault+0x324/0x970
[ 400.349337] exc_page_fault+0x76/0xf0
[ 400.349350] asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ 400.349360] RIP: 0033:0x55a480d77375
[ 400.349384] Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 49 3b 66 10 0f 86 ae 02 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 58 48 8b 10 <83> 7a 10 00 0f 84 27 02 00 00 44 0f b6 42 28 44 0f b6 4a 29 41 80
[ 400.349392] RSP: 002b:00007f18c37fd8b8 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 400.349401] RAX: 00007f18c37fd9d0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 400.349407] RDX: 000055a484407d38 RSI: 000000c000e8b0c0 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 400.349412] RBP: 00007f18c37fd910 R08: 000055a484017f60 R09: 000055a484066f80
[ 400.349417] R10: 0000000000194000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000008
[ 400.349422] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000c000476a80 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 400.349430] </TASK>
[ 400.349452]
[ 400.349454] Allocated by task 5800:
[ 400.349459] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
[ 400.349469] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 400.349475] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x89/0x90
[ 400.349482] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0xdc/0x2a0
[ 400.349492] bfq_get_queue+0x1ef/0x1100
[ 400.349502] __bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x11a/0x510
[ 400.349511] bfq_insert_requests+0xf55/0x9030
[ 400.349519] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x446/0x14c0
[ 400.349527] __blk_flush_plug+0x27c/0x4e0
[ 400.349534] blk_finish_plug+0x52/0xa0
[ 400.349540] _xfs_buf_ioapply+0x739/0xc30 [xfs]
[ 400.350246] __xfs_buf_submit+0x1b2/0x640 [xfs]
[ 400.350967] xfs_buf_read_map+0x306/0xa20 [xfs]
[ 400.351672] xfs_trans_read_buf_map+0x285/0x7d0 [xfs]
[ 400.352386] xfs_imap_to_bp+0x107/0x270 [xfs]
[ 400.353077] xfs_iget+0x70d/0x1eb0 [xfs]
[ 400.353786] xfs_lookup+0x2ca/0x3a0 [xfs]
[ 400.354506] xfs_vn_lookup+0x14e/0x1a0 [xfs]
[ 400.355197] __lookup_slow+0x19c/0x340
[ 400.355204] lookup_one_unlocked+0xfc/0x120
[ 400.355211] ovl_lookup_single+0x1b3/0xcf0 [overlay]
[ 400.355255] ovl_lookup_layer+0x316/0x490 [overlay]
[ 400.355295] ovl_lookup+0x844/0x1fd0 [overlay]
[ 400.355351] lookup_one_qstr_excl+0xef/0x150
[ 400.355357] do_unlinkat+0x22a/0x620
[ 400.355366] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0x109/0x1e0
[ 400.355375] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
[ 400.355384] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: glink: fix off-by-one in connector_status
UCSI connector's indices start from 1 up to 3, PMIC_GLINK_MAX_PORTS.
Correct the condition in the pmic_glink_ucsi_connector_status()
callback, fixing Type-C orientation reporting for the third USB-C
connector. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: Fix ordering of iput() and watched_objects decrement
Ensure the superblock is kept alive until we're done with iput().
Holding a reference to an inode is not allowed unless we ensure the
superblock stays alive, which fsnotify does by keeping the
watched_objects count elevated, so iput() must happen before the
watched_objects decrement.
This can lead to a UAF of something like sb->s_fs_info in tmpfs, but the
UAF is hard to hit because race orderings that oops are more likely, thanks
to the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() block in generic_shutdown_super().
Also, ensure that fsnotify_put_sb_watched_objects() doesn't call
fsnotify_sb_watched_objects() on a superblock that may have already been
freed, which would cause a UAF read of sb->s_fsnotify_info. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix possible UAF in sctp_v6_available()
A lockdep report [1] with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y hints
that sctp_v6_available() is calling dev_get_by_index_rcu()
and ipv6_chk_addr() without holding rcu.
[1]
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: G W
-----------------------------
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by sctp_hello/31495:
#0: ffff9f1ebbdb7418 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sctp_bind (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 net/sctp/socket.c:315) sctp
stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 31495 Comm: sctp_hello Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)
dev_get_by_index_rcu (net/core/dev.c:876 (discriminator 7))
sctp_v6_available (net/sctp/ipv6.c:701) sctp
sctp_do_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:400 (discriminator 1)) sctp
sctp_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:320) sctp
inet6_bind_sk (net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:465)
? security_socket_bind (security/security.c:4581 (discriminator 1))
__sys_bind (net/socket.c:1848 net/socket.c:1869)
? do_user_addr_fault (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:880 ./include/linux/mm.h:729 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340)
? do_user_addr_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:98 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/mm.h:729 (discriminator 13) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340 (discriminator 13))
__x64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1877 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f59b934a1e7
Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 b8 31 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
All code
========
0: 44 00 00 add %r8b,(%rax)
3: 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c39(%rip),%rdx # 0xc8c43
a: f7 d8 neg %eax
c: 64 89 02 mov %eax,%fs:(%rdx)
f: b8 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffff,%eax
14: eb bd jmp 0xffffffffffffffd3
16: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
1d: 00 00 00
20: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax)
23: b8 31 00 00 00 mov $0x31,%eax
28: 0f 05 syscall
2a:* 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax <-- trapping instruction
30: 73 01 jae 0x33
32: c3 ret
33: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c43
3a: f7 d8 neg %eax
3c: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)
3f: 48 rex.W
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax
6: 73 01 jae 0x9
8: c3 ret
9: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c19
10: f7 d8 neg %eax
12: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)
15: 48 rex.W
RSP: 002b:00007ffe2d0ad398 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RCX: 00007f59b934a1e7
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007f59b9253298 R11: 000000000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Prevent a bad reference count on CPU nodes
When populating cache leaves we previously fetched the CPU device node
at the very beginning. But when ACPI is enabled we go through a
specific branch which returns early and does not call 'of_node_put' for
the node that was acquired.
Since we are not using a CPU device node for the ACPI code anyways, we
can simply move the initialization of it just passed the ACPI block, and
we are guaranteed to have an 'of_node_put' call for the acquired node.
This prevents a bad reference count of the CPU device node.
Moreover, the previous function did not check for errors when acquiring
the device node, so a return -ENOENT has been added for that case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Start the RTC update work later
The RTC update work involves runtime resuming the UFS controller. Hence,
only start the RTC update work after runtime power management in the UFS
driver has been fully initialized. This patch fixes the following kernel
crash:
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Workqueue: events ufshcd_rtc_work
Call trace:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c (P)
pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c (L)
pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c
ufshcd_rtc_work+0x138/0x1b4
process_one_work+0x148/0x288
worker_thread+0x2cc/0x3d4
kthread+0x110/0x114
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix another deadlock during RTC update
If ufshcd_rtc_work calls ufshcd_rpm_put_sync() and the pm's usage_count
is 0, we will enter the runtime suspend callback. However, the runtime
suspend callback will wait to flush ufshcd_rtc_work, causing a deadlock.
Replace ufshcd_rpm_put_sync() with ufshcd_rpm_put() to avoid the
deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Vangogh: Fix kernel memory out of bounds write
KASAN reports that the GPU metrics table allocated in
vangogh_tables_init() is not large enough for the memset done in
smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics(). Condensed report follows:
[ 33.861314] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics+0x73/0x200 [amdgpu]
[ 33.861799] Write of size 168 at addr ffff888129f59500 by task mangoapp/1067
...
[ 33.861808] CPU: 6 UID: 1000 PID: 1067 Comm: mangoapp Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc4 #356 1a56f59a8b5182eeaf67eb7cb8b13594dd23b544
[ 33.861816] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 33.861818] Hardware name: Valve Galileo/Galileo, BIOS F7G0107 12/01/2023
[ 33.861822] Call Trace:
[ 33.861826] <TASK>
[ 33.861829] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0x90
[ 33.861838] print_report+0xce/0x620
[ 33.861853] kasan_report+0xda/0x110
[ 33.862794] kasan_check_range+0xfd/0x1a0
[ 33.862799] __asan_memset+0x23/0x40
[ 33.862803] smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics+0x73/0x200 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.863306] vangogh_get_gpu_metrics_v2_4+0x123/0xad0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.864257] vangogh_common_get_gpu_metrics+0xb0c/0xbc0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.865682] amdgpu_dpm_get_gpu_metrics+0xcc/0x110 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.866160] amdgpu_get_gpu_metrics+0x154/0x2d0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.867135] dev_attr_show+0x43/0xc0
[ 33.867147] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1f1/0x3b0
[ 33.867155] seq_read_iter+0x3f8/0x1140
[ 33.867173] vfs_read+0x76c/0xc50
[ 33.867198] ksys_read+0xfb/0x1d0
[ 33.867214] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x160
...
[ 33.867353] Allocated by task 378 on cpu 7 at 22.794876s:
[ 33.867358] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50
[ 33.867364] kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
[ 33.867367] __kasan_kmalloc+0x87/0x90
[ 33.867371] vangogh_init_smc_tables+0x3f9/0x840 [amdgpu]
[ 33.867835] smu_sw_init+0xa32/0x1850 [amdgpu]
[ 33.868299] amdgpu_device_init+0x467b/0x8d90 [amdgpu]
[ 33.868733] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x19/0xf0 [amdgpu]
[ 33.869167] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x2d6/0xcd0 [amdgpu]
[ 33.869608] local_pci_probe+0xda/0x180
[ 33.869614] pci_device_probe+0x43f/0x6b0
Empirically we can confirm that the former allocates 152 bytes for the
table, while the latter memsets the 168 large block.
Root cause appears that when GPU metrics tables for v2_4 parts were added
it was not considered to enlarge the table to fit.
The fix in this patch is rather "brute force" and perhaps later should be
done in a smarter way, by extracting and consolidating the part version to
size logic to a common helper, instead of brute forcing the largest
possible allocation. Nevertheless, for now this works and fixes the out of
bounds write.
v2:
* Drop impossible v3_0 case. (Mario)
(cherry picked from commit 0880f58f9609f0200483a49429af0f050d281703) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Avoid CPU lockups due fifo occupancy check loop
Driver waits indefinitely for the fifo occupancy to go below a threshold
as soon as the pacing interrupt is received. This can cause soft lockup on
one of the processors, if the rate of DB is very high.
Add a loop count for FPGA and exit the __wait_for_fifo_occupancy_below_th
if the loop is taking more time. Pacing will be continuing until the
occupancy is below the threshold. This is ensured by the checks in
bnxt_re_pacing_timer_exp and further scheduling the work for pacing based
on the fifo occupancy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Don't free job in TDR
Freeing job in TDR is not safe as TDR can pass the run_job thread
resulting in UAF. It is only safe for free job to naturally be called by
the scheduler. Rather free job in TDR, add to pending list.
(cherry picked from commit ea2f6a77d0c40d97f4a4dc93fee4afe15d94926d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
reset: starfive: jh71x0: Fix accessing the empty member on JH7110 SoC
data->asserted will be NULL on JH7110 SoC since commit 82327b127d41
("reset: starfive: Add StarFive JH7110 reset driver") was added. Add
the judgment condition to avoid errors when calling reset_control_status
on JH7110 SoC. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bpf: must hold reference on net namespace
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x640/0x6b0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880106fe400 by task repro/72=
bpf_nf_link_release+0xda/0x1e0
bpf_link_free+0x139/0x2d0
bpf_link_release+0x68/0x80
__fput+0x414/0xb60
Eric says:
It seems that bpf was able to defer the __nf_unregister_net_hook()
after exit()/close() time.
Perhaps a netns reference is missing, because the netns has been
dismantled/freed already.
bpf_nf_link_attach() does :
link->net = net;
But I do not see a reference being taken on net.
Add such a reference and release it after hook unreg.
Note that I was unable to get syzbot reproducer to work, so I
do not know if this resolves this splat. |
