| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Don't WARN on an unknown VM ioctl in protected mode
kvm_pkvm_ioctl_allowed() WARNs when kvm_get_cap_for_kvm_ioctl() doesn't
find the ioctl number in vm_ioctl_caps[], and kvm_arch_vm_ioctl() calls
it for every number the generic code doesn't handle, so
ioctl(vm_fd, 0xdeadbeef) from userspace taints a pKVM host and panics it
under panic_on_warn. The lookup is fed userspace input: return false,
and userspace gets the -EINVAL kvm_arch_vm_ioctl() returns for that
number on a host without pKVM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc
While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:
-> nf_ct_helper()
-> helper->help()
-> nf_ct_expect_related_report()
-> nf_ct_expect_insert()
-> hlist_add_head_rcu(&exp->lnode, &master_help->expectations)
In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.
Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.
Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that's not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure. And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: fix dma_alloc_coherent() leak on macb_alloc() error paths
Fix 3 leaks in macb_alloc() error paths:
- Tx buffer allocated but crossing a 4G boundary: Tx leaked.
- Rx buffer allocation fails: Tx leaked.
- Rx buffer allocated but crossing a 4G boundary: Tx & Rx leaked.
This is because our error handling calls macb_free(bp) which in turn
frees the buffers stored in bp->queues[0], but nothing has been stored
in there. Fix by storing allocated buffers into bp->queues[0] ASAP. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipconfig: bound DHCP option construction
ic_dhcp_init_options() appends the hostname (option 12), vendor-class
(option 60) and client-ID (option 61) options into the fixed 312-byte
bootp_pkt.exten[] buffer. Only the client-ID branch checked the
remaining space; the hostname and vendor-class writes were unbounded.
A 64-byte hostname together with the maximum 252-byte dhcpclass=
identifier needs 18 + (2 + 64) + (2 + 252) = 338 of the 312 available
bytes even before the terminating END marker, so the vendor-class memcpy
runs past the end of exten[]. With CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE this is
reported as a field-spanning write and, when the kernel is booted with
panic_on_warn=1, aborts boot with a panic.
Route the optional options through a common helper that makes sure the
option, its 2-byte header and the END marker all fit and drops an option
that would not. Configurations with short options keep sending exactly
the same bytes as before. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hid-oxp: use cancel_delayed_work_sync() in remove
oxp_hid_remove() uses cancel_delayed_work() for all three delayed work
items. cancel_delayed_work() only dequeues a pending work item without
waiting for a currently executing callback to finish. If any of the
work callbacks (oxp_rgb_queue_fn, oxp_btn_queue_fn, oxp_mcu_init_fn) is
running at the time of removal, the callback continues executing
concurrently with hid_hw_close() and hid_hw_stop(), accessing the HID
device after it has been closed and stopped.
Use cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead to ensure that any in-progress
work callback completes before device teardown proceeds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate device-supplied DMA indices
In btintel_pcie_msix_rx_handle(), the driver processes RX completion
descriptors (urbd1) written by the PCIe device into DMA-coherent memory.
urbd1->frbd_tag (a 16-bit field fully controlled by the device firmware
via DMA) is used directly as an array index into rxq->bufs[] without any
bounds check. rxq->bufs[] has only BTINTEL_PCIE_RX_DESCS_COUNT (64)
entries, while frbd_tag can be any value 0-65535. A malicious or
malfunctioning device can write an out-of-range frbd_tag, causing the
driver to dereference an out-of-bounds data_buf pointer.
Additionally, cr_hia is read from a DMA-shared index array also writable
by the device; if the device sets cr_hia >= rxq->count, the while-loop
never terminates because cr_tia is wrapped via modulo rxq->count and can
never equal an out-of-range cr_hia.
Add bounds validation for cr_hia and frbd_tag in the RX path, and cr_hia
in the TX path. Log invalid values with bt_dev_err before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: samsung-dsim: fix TE GPIO lifetime for host attach
When the Exynos DSI driver was generalized into samsung-dsim, the TE
GPIO acquisition was switched from gpiod_get_optional() to
devm_gpiod_get_optional() while keeping the matching gpiod_put() calls.
That combination is wrong for a managed descriptor.
However, dropping the puts and keeping the managed get is also wrong:
samsung_dsim_register_te_irq() runs from the DSI host attach callback,
and host detach/reattach can happen without destroying the device that
owns the managed action. A second attach would then request the GPIO
again without having released it.
Switch back to a non-managed gpiod_get_optional() and keep the explicit
gpiod_put() on the request_irq() error path and in
samsung_dsim_unregister_te_irq().
[Luca: remove unnecessary comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Free have_run_cpus during VM destruction even if VM is no longer SEV
Unconditionally free SEV's "have run CPUs" cpumask in the VM destroy path,
i.e. even for what appear to be non-SEV VMs, as an SEV VM becomes a non-SEV
VM if its state is intra-host migrated. Alternatively, the mask could be
freed in sev_migrate_from() when "converting" the source VM, but that gets
annoying because ideally KVM would nullify the mask to guard against UAF,
and nullifying the mask would need be conditioned on CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y.
Freeing the mask during sev_migrate_from() is also not robust against other
KVM bugs, though that's kind of a moot point since any such bugs would show
up even if sev->active is never set. I.e. KVM must get that side of things
correct. But, that's not a great reason to add more code just to make
things marginally less robust. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pci: Fix missing device lock in zpci_report_status()
When pdev is non-NULL, zpci_report_status() accesses the device's driver.
To get a consistent state matching the recovery, the device lock needs to
be held. Do so by expanding the existing device lock critical section.
The lock only needs to be held when the pdev is non-NULL, so extract
the pdev-specific reporting into a helper function which also adds a
lockdep assertion to detect calls without the device lock held. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: fix object leaks in virtio_gpu_resource_create_blob_ioctl()
virtio_gpu_resource_create_blob_ioctl() calls drm_gem_object_release() on
both the virtio_gpu_resource_assign_uuid() and drm_gem_handle_create()
error paths instead of dropping the reference it owns, so
obj->funcs->free() never runs and the virtio_gpu_object, the resource id
and the host-side resource are leaked.
Use drm_gem_object_put() instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: Set AW_FLUSH_MODE alongside AW_FLUSH when flushing the mailbox
When tearing down the FW mailbox Rx ring, fbnic_mbx_reset_desc_ring()
writes AW_CFG with FLUSH set and everything else, BME included, cleared.
Clearing BME halts the device's writes to the host but leaves the staged
requests parked in the PUL write pipeline rather than draining them, so
on the write path FLUSH alone never terminates the outstanding requests
and the flush the firmware waits on never completes.
Add the FLUSH_MODE definition and set both bits so the staged writes
drain out of the pipeline on their own. BME stays cleared, so nothing
lands on the host; it is restored later in fbnic_mbx_init_desc_ring()
when the ring is rebuilt, once the outstanding writes are gone.
The read path is unaffected. AR_CFG has no equivalent mode bit and
AR_FLUSH terminates the outstanding reads by itself, so it is left as
is.
Both writes remain plain stores rather than read-modify-writes. That is
deliberate: the matching write in fbnic_mbx_init_desc_ring() restores
BME and the TLP attributes, and clears both flush bits as a side effect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau/clk: fix list cursor use after loop in nvkm_clk_ustate_update
If list_for_each_entry() exits without hitting a break then "pstate" is
not a valid pstate pointer. Introduce a "found" variable instead.
The check is reachable from userspace: nvkm_clk_ustate_update() takes the
pstate id straight from the 'pstate' debugfs file, so requesting an id
that is not in clk->states - or any id at all when the perf tables are
broken and the list is empty - makes the pstate->pstate != req test
dereference the list head cast to a struct nvkm_pstate, which is an
out-of-bounds read.
[Francesco: rebased on drm-misc-next, expanded the commit message] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: fix manual hash table handle IDR aliasing
A u32 hash table created with an explicit handle ('tc filter add ...
handle 801: u32 divisor N') keys its IDR entry on the raw handle, while
the destroy paths free it under handle2id(handle). The two key domains
disagree for handles in the 0x800..0xFFF htid range:
handle2id() folds them back into the auto-allocated id space (1..0x7FF).
A manual table therefore leaves its raw-keyed IDR entry unreachable on
delete (a permanent leak), and its delete can drop the idr entry of an
unrelated live auto table. A later auto allocation can then hand out a
handle that aliases the live manual table; u32_lookup_ht() first-match
routes lookups and TCA_U32_LINK for that htid to the wrong table.
Key the divisor-path alloc on handle2id(handle) so allocation and
removal share one key domain. A manual handle that maps onto an id
already in use is rejected with -ENOSPC, and auto allocation skips ids
held by live manual tables.
Conditions to recreate:
ip link add test0 type dummy
tc qdisc add dev test0 clsact
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 \
handle 801: u32 divisor 16
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 2 u32 divisor 16
tc -d filter show dev test0 ingress | grep 'fh 801:'
# unpatched: two live tables with handle 0x80100000 (the pref 2 root
# hnode is auto-allocated id 1); patched: the auto hnode takes id 2.
Also tested with a poc with a live u32 table on the block, add/delete a manual
table 'handle 901: u32 divisor 1' twice; unpatched, the re-add fails with
-ENOSPC because the raw key leaked on the first delete. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fprobe: Terminate the fgraph_data list when the reservation is not filled
fprobe_fgraph_entry() reserves shadow stack space for every fprobe with
an exit handler, but only fills it for those whose entry handler returns
0. fgraph_reserve_data() does not clear the area, so fprobe_return()
parses the unused tail as headers left over from an earlier call, and an
exit handler can run twice or despite its entry handler asking to skip
it.
Write a zero word after the last entry to terminate the walk. A zeroed
slot does not decode to a NULL fprobe on the arches that encode the
header into one unsigned long, since arch_decode_fprobe_header_fp() ORs
in FPROBE_HEADER_MSB_PATTERN, so make read_fprobe_header() return NULL
for a zeroed slot. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: Use a 32-bit compare in xsk_map_gen_lookup
xsk_map_gen_lookup() loads a u32 key and compares it with max_entries
using BPF_JMP_IMM. BPF immediates are sign-extended to 64 bits, so a
max_entries value of 0x80000000 or higher becomes a threshold larger
than every zero-extended 32-bit key. An out-of-range index then skips
the bounds check and the generated lookup reads past xsk_map[].
Compare with BPF_JMP32_IMM so the check stays in 32-bit unsigned range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clears KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE in kvm->arch.vcpu_features
when it fails, but vcpu_has_sve() tests KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE,
which is left set. Later vCPUs on that VM then skip the SVE setup and
register with a NULL sve_state, which the guest's first FP access hands
to sve_load_state().
Return the error without touching vcpu_features. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: amd_sfh: Validate PCI BAR size before mapping
The amd_sfh driver maps PCI BAR 2 using pcim_iomap_regions() and
subsequently accesses MMIO registers at offsets up to 0x10958 (e.g.,
AMD_P2C_MSG3 at 0x1068C). However, the driver never validates that the BAR
size is large enough to cover these accesses. If the driver is bound to a
device with a smaller BAR 2, this leads to an out-of-bounds memory access
and a page fault during the probe function.
For example, a page fault can occur when reading from privdata->mmio +
AMD_P2C_MSG3 in mp2_select_ops():
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000390368c
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1012c1067 PMD 105b64067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:readl arch/x86/include/asm/io.h:59 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mp2_select_ops drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c:282
[inline]
RIP: 0010:amd_mp2_pci_probe+0x337/0x5f0
drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/amd_sfh_pcie.c:487
Call Trace:
<TASK>
local_pci_probe drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:332 [inline]
pci_call_probe drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:394 [inline]
__pci_device_probe drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:455 [inline]
pci_device_probe+0x431/0xc90 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:489
Fix this by verifying that the length of BAR 2 is at least 128KB before
attempting to map it. Since the maximum accessed offset is 0x10958, and PCI
BAR sizes are powers of 2, any legitimate hardware will have a BAR size of
at least 128KB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/uv: Prevent potential out-of-bounds read
When the system has more than 85 secrets, the uv_secret_list struct
array only holds up to 85 items per page, resulting in an out of bounds
read in find_secret_in_page if the targeted secret is in the next page
or not stored at all.
Fix this by looping over the number of stored secrets which is the
per sub-list count of stored secrets and not the overall count. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length
The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses
it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image
can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value
smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very
large length.
Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously
proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an
underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the
firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough
Fix multiple out-of-bounds reads in Bluetooth BNEP frame processing:
1. In bnep_rx_frame() and bnep_ctrl_frame() (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c),
use pskb_may_pull() to verify the BNEP header, control type byte,
filter count, and extension headers exist before reading them, and
return 0 after handling BNEP_CONTROL instead of falling through to
Ethernet frame submission when no extension headers follow.
2. In bnep_net_xmit() (net/bluetooth/bnep/netdev.c), verify skb->len >=
ETH_HLEN with pskb_may_pull() before reading the 14-byte Ethernet
header to prevent an out-of-bounds heap read and infoleak on short
AF_PACKET TX frames. |
