| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta contains an account enumeration vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to confirm registered display names and emails via a distinct HTTP 409 response. Attackers can submit guest comments to the comment create endpoint with candidate user and mail values to link names to emails for targeted phishing. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-beta lacks brute-force lockout in the removeTwofactorConfig() 2FA removal endpoint, allowing authenticated attackers to guess TOTP codes without limit. Attackers holding a hijacked session and CSRF token can repeatedly POST guesses to /api/user/remove-twofactor to permanently disable the victim's 2FA. |
| phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in GroupController::saveCategoryRestrictions() that lets delegated administrators assign categories outside their own scope. Category-restricted administrators can POST to /admin/api/group/category-restrictions with out-of-scope or empty categoryIds to grant groups unrestricted category access. |
| phpMyFAQ 3.2.1 before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows authenticated content authors to inject JavaScript by embedding iframes with data:text/html sources in FAQ or News content. Attackers can bypass the hostless media-host allowlist in FaqHelper::cleanUpContent(), which is rendered via Twig's raw filter, to run phishing interfaces or top-frame redirects for viewers. |
| phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. The `StopWords::add()` method inversions prior to 4.1.6 builds a SQL `INSERT` statement using `sprintf()` and inserts the user-supplied stop word value directly into the query string without calling the application's database escaping function on it. A sibling method, `StopWords::update()`, which modifies an existing stop word, correctly escapes the same kind of input. The omission is isolated to the `add()` (insert) code path. An authenticated administrator who can reach the stop-word management feature can submit a crafted value as the "word" parameter that breaks out of the SQL string literal and injects arbitrary SQL, including statements to drop tables, exfiltrate data, or modify other rows in the database. Version 4.1.6 fixes the issue. |
| phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 3.2.0 through 4.1.5 contain an authentication bypass in its public two-factor authentication verification flow: an unauthenticated attacker can submit an account’s numeric user ID and a valid or brute-forced six-digit TOTP code without first authenticating with the account password, allowing takeover of any 2FA-enabled account, including administrator accounts. Version 4.1.6 is patched by binding TOTP verification to a session established after successful password authentication and limiting failed TOTP attempts. No official workaround is documented; affected installations should upgrade to 4.1.6 or later. |
| phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in versions prior to 4.2.0-alpha allows any unauthenticated user (or low-privileged registered user) to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in an administrator's browser when they review or edit a user-submitted FAQ entry. This leads to admin account takeover via session theft. The vulnerability exists because `html_entity_decode()` converts HTML entities into executable HTML after `strip_tags()` has already passed them through, and the admin template renders the content with Twig's `|raw` filter without any output sanitization. Version 4.2.0-alpha fixes the issue. |
| phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.2.0-alpha, an authenticated SQL LIKE wildcard injection vulnerability in phpMyFAQ’s chat user search allows any logged-in user to bypass the intended display-name search filter and enumerate active users. The endpoint escapes SQL string syntax but does not escape `%` and `_`, which remain active `LIKE` wildcards. Version 4.2.0-alpha patches the issue. |
| phpMyFAQ versions before 4.1.8 include live TOTP shared secrets in plaintext within user data export ZIP files. Attackers obtaining exported archives can extract the TOTP seed and generate valid one-time codes to bypass two-factor authentication. |
| phpMyFAQ versions before 4.1.8 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the user control panel API endpoint that allows authenticated attackers to change account passwords without verifying the current password. Attackers with session access can submit a PUT request to the user data update endpoint with only a CSRF token to silently change any user's password, including administrators, causing irreversible account takeover and victim lockout. |
| phpMyFAQ versions before 4.1.8 fail to validate CAPTCHA when the store parameter is set to 'now' in question submission requests. Unauthenticated attackers can bypass CAPTCHA protection and submit unlimited questions directly, causing database pollution and triggering outgoing mail notifications. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.2.0-alpha.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the admin dashboard API endpoints searches and content-health that enforce only authentication without permission checks. Any authenticated user can access these endpoints to read site-wide search statistics and content-health counters regardless of their privilege level. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.8 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the question creation endpoint where the isAddingQuestionsAllowed() method grants access to all callers when main.enableAskQuestions is enabled, ignoring the records.allowQuestionsForGuests setting. Unauthenticated attackers can submit questions via the question/create API endpoint to bypass guest submission restrictions and inject spam into the admin moderation queue. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.8 enforces incorrect permission checks on admin content pages, allowing lesser-privileged editors to read draft and inactive content. Attackers with only add permissions can access news edit and FAQ translate endpoints to view unpublished content invisible to the public. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.8 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its two-factor authentication (TOTP) disable functionality. The removeTwofactorConfig() handler (reachable via POST /api/user/remove-twofactor) verifies only that the user is logged in and that a valid CSRF token is supplied, then disables TOTP without requiring password re-entry or a current TOTP code. The same downgrade is also reachable inline via PUT /api/user/data/update, which accepts a plain twofactor_enabled form field under the same session+CSRF-only guard. An attacker who has hijacked a user's session can silently strip two-factor protection from any account, including administrator accounts, after which password-only authentication succeeds. |
| phpMyFAQ versions 3.1.0 through 4.1.6 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in AuthLdap::create(). When LDAP authentication is enabled, after a successful LDAP bind the code calls User::setStatus('active') unconditionally, which overwrites the account_status column of a pre-existing local account from 'blocked' to 'active'. As a result, a user whose local phpMyFAQ account has been administratively blocked can restore their account and log in by authenticating via LDAP. The state transition is not logged, so administrators cannot detect that the block was overridden. Fixed in 4.1.7. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7, when configured to use PostgreSQL via the native pgsql PHP extension, declares an incorrect LIKE ESCAPE character ('=') in the Search/Database/Pgsql.php backend while escapeLikeWildcards() escapes user input with the '|' prefix. As a result, wildcard escaping is a no-op and user-supplied % and _ characters remain active LIKE wildcards. An unauthenticated attacker can submit such characters in the public FAQ search form to force maximally broad pattern matches and expensive sequential scans, resulting in a denial of service. The PDO PostgreSQL backend is not affected, and quotes remain escaped so this does not enable quote-breaking SQL injection or data exfiltration. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 fails to apply parent FAQ visibility checks before returning child resources including comments and attachments. Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve restricted comment text, commenter email addresses, and attachment filenames for FAQ records they cannot directly access by querying the comments and attachments API endpoints. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the glossary create and update endpoints caused by truncating an escaped string before embedding it in a SQL literal. Authenticated users with glossary add or edit permissions can craft a payload with a dangling backslash to escape the closing quote and inject arbitrary SQL commands to read sensitive database information. |
| phpMyFAQ versions before 4.1.7 fail to validate active status in the PDF export endpoint, allowing unauthenticated attackers to retrieve draft FAQ metadata. Attackers can access the public PDF export route with sequential FAQ identifiers to obtain titles, solution IDs, author names, and last-update timestamps of inactive or unpublished FAQs. |
