| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| The STM32WBA IEEE 802.15.4 driver in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_stm32wba.c computed the packet length of a received frame as pkt_len = rx_frame->length - IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH without first checking that the radio-reported length could hold an FCS. pkt_len is a uint8_t, so a reported length of 0 or 1 wrapped to 254 or 255. The only bound on the resulting value was __ASSERT_NO_MSG(pkt_len <= CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE), which compiles to nothing in the default production configuration (CONFIG_ASSERT=n).
The length originates in the ST link-layer receive-done metadata (p_metadata->length, stored by stm32wba_802154_receive_done()), and ultimately in the PHY header of a frame received over the air, so it is influenced by any attacker within radio range of the device. Reaching the underflow requires the vendor link layer to surface a frame shorter than the FCS with no error; the driver performed no validation of its own on that value.
When the underflow occurs, stm32wba_802154_rx_thread() calls net_pkt_write(pkt, rx_frame->psdu, pkt_len) with a length of about 254 bytes against a receive buffer that holds at most one PHY packet (IEEE802154_MAX_PHY_PACKET_SIZE, 127 bytes). This reads roughly 128 bytes past the end of the radio receive buffer and copies that adjacent memory into a network packet that is submitted to the networking stack, giving an out-of-bounds read with a potential disclosure of adjacent RAM plus needless oversized packet allocation in the RX thread.
The fix rejects a frame whose reported length is smaller than IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH before the subtraction, and replaces the compiled-out assertion with a runtime length check that drops oversized frames — matching the runtime check already present in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_nrf5.c. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Windows Search Component allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows OLE DB allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows iSCSI allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in SQLite allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Windows Media Foundation allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Client for NFS allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Client for NFS allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in HID Parser Library allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| libIEC61850 is an open-source implementation of IEC 61850 client and server protocols including MMS, GOOSE, Sampled Values, and R-Session. Prior to 1.6.2, checkDataSetAccess reverses the source and destination arguments to StringUtils_copyStringToBuffer while constructing an MMS_ASSOCIATION_SPECIFIC dataset reference. The helper treats uninitialized dataSetRef[130] storage as a source string, causing strlen to read beyond the stack buffer, and then copies those bytes into the caller-owned listName buffer. A remote defineNamedVariableList request can crash servers that have dynamic dataset service enabled and a dataset access handler installed; the advisory also observes caller stack corruption but establishes denial of service as the primary impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2. |
| Out-of-bounds read in HID Parser Library allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in HID Parser Library allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows DWM Core Library allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a received frame holds a plain 14-byte struct net_eth_hdr. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the same buffer is reinterpreted as the 18-byte struct net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length: the VLAN TCI and the inner ethertype are read from offsets 14..17, past pkt->buffer->len, and hdr_len is raised to 18 so the subsequent net_buf_pull() removes more bytes than the buffer holds.
A single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers this. No knowledge of the node's VLAN configuration is needed: net_eth_get_vlan_iface() returns the base interface for the priority tag 0, and a broadcast destination address satisfies the "frame is for me" test, so a 16-byte broadcast frame with ethertype 0x8100 and TCI 0x0000 reaches the pull. Nothing in the receive path enforces the 60-byte Ethernet minimum — the USB CDC ECM and CDC NCM gadget classes in particular hand host-supplied frames of any non-zero length straight to net_recv_data().
With assertions enabled, net_buf_simple_pull() asserts and the node panics. In a production build (assertions and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING off) the uint16_t buffer length underflows to 65534 and buf->data is advanced past the end of the fragment's storage, so every later parser reads far outside the buffer and any net_buf_add() on that fragment computes tailroom from the underflowed length. The result is a reliable remote denial of service and out-of-bounds access with information-disclosure and corruption potential.
Only configurations built with CONFIG_NET_VLAN=y that have a VLAN enabled on the receiving Ethernet interface, and whose MAC does not strip VLAN tags in hardware (ETHERNET_HW_VLAN_TAG_STRIP), are affected. The fix rejects the frame before the tag is read, so hdr_len is thereafter either 14 or 18 with both sizes validated against pkt->buffer->len. |
