| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in HID class driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Text Shaping allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Bind Filter Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Scripting Engine allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Management Instrumentation allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| When the PCM sample array needs to grow, the RACK stack doubles a 16-bit allocation counter. Repeated doublings caused the counter to wrap to zero, resulting in a near-zero-length allocation followed by a copy of the existing samples into the undersized buffer. A remote peer can trigger the expansion by sending a sufficient number of ACKs on an established connection.
A remote attacker who can establish a TCP connection to a system using the RACK stack can trigger an out-of-bounds write of approximately 512 KB in the kernel heap possibly resulting in a kernel panic. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 2.0.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow has a heap buffer overflow and stale-heap disclosure in _tiffWriteProc when saving compressed TIFF data through libtiff to a target without a usable fileno(), such as BytesIO. The callback sizes its allocation from the prior buffer size instead of the current write position, allowing an attacker-controlled out-of-line TIFF tag or retained ICC profile to be copied beyond the allocation after libtiff seeks forward. This overflow can crash the process and may allow code execution. Independently, unwritten alignment gaps in compressed TIFF output larger than 64 KiB can disclose stale heap bytes without a crafted tag. File paths and targets with real file descriptors are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.2.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow's tiled-TIFF decoder can read past the tile buffer while copying four-byte pixels. In _decodeTile, libtiff can return a tile allocation smaller than the required row stride multiplied by the tile length, and Pillow's stride-and-copy loop walks beyond that allocation. An attacker can supply a crafted tiled TIFF to an application that loads it. This can expose adjacent heap data in pixels or crash the process. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
vti_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or
moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that
lives in t->net.
Gate vti_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed. |
| In NTFS-3G before 2026.7.7, a heap buffer overflow exists in cat() in ntfscat.c that allows an attacker to corrupt heap memory in the ntfscat binary by crafting a malicious NTFS image. The overflow is triggered by reading a file. |
| A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability was identified in TP-Link Tapo C100/C101 v5, C210 v3.6 and C520WS v2.6 in the HTTP POST body parsing logic due to missing validation of remaining buffer capacity after dynamic allocation, due to insufficient boundary validation when handling externally supplied HTTP input.
An attacker
on the same network segment could trigger heap memory corruption conditions by
sending crafted payloads that cause write operations beyond allocated buffer
boundaries. Successful exploitation
causes a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition, causing the device’s process to
crash or become unresponsive. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pkey: Check length in pkey_pckmo handler implementation
Explicitly check the length of the target buffer in the pkey_pckmo
implementation of the key_to_protkey() handler function. The handler
function fails, if the generated output data exceeds the length of the
provided target buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()
receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by
(big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose:
add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset
sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain
actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) +
big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the
check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case.
A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb()
then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private
into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds
write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path.
Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area
When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the
GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max
possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of
the shared buffer.
The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the
length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always
specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len
is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know
the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).
Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
