| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Copy per-CPU map value padding in copy_map_value_long()
In kernel, per-CPU map elements are stored with
round_up(map->value_size, 8) bytes. On UAPI lookup paths, it copies the
rounded size for each CPU into a temporary buffer.
However, copy_map_value_long() passes 'map->value_size' to
bpf_obj_memcpy(). When the map has special fields, bpf_obj_memcpy() copies
around those fields with memcpy(), and does not copy the tail padding
between 'map->value_size' and round_up(map->value_size, 8).
The temporary UAPI lookup buffers are allocated without __GFP_ZERO. As a
result, when the per-CPU map's value size is not equal to
round_up(map->value_size, 8), UAPI LOOKUP_ELEM and its variants can return
stale heap contents from that padding to user space. The same issue
applies to bpf_iter for per-CPU maps.
Pass round_up(map->value_size, 8) to bpf_obj_memcpy() from
copy_map_value_long(), so per-CPU maps both with and without special
fields copy the entire per-CPU slot. Remove the now redundant round_up()
from bpf_obj_memcpy()'s long_memcpy path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mm_init: handle alloc_percpu failure in free_area_init_core_hotplug
We miss a failed allocation check for pgdat->per_cpu_nodestats, which
results in a NULL deref when we offset into the per-cpu area.
Propagate -ENOMEM up the stack and leave per_cpu_nodestats pointing
at boot_nodestats so a later online can retry the allocation.
hotadd_init_pgdat() returns NULL on failure, which __try_online_node()
already maps to -ENOMEM.
On failure nothing needs to be unwound:
- the node is never marked online
- per_cpu_nodestats is left pointing at boot_nodestats
- __add_memory_resource() cleans up pending memblock resources
- later online attempts retry the per_cpu_nodestats allocation |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix CPU stall in xilinx_dma_poll_timeout
Currently when calling xilinx_dma_poll_timeout with delay_us=0 and a
condition that is never fulfilled, the CPU busy-waits for prolonged time
and the timeout triggers only with a massive delay causing a CPU stall.
This happens due to a huge underestimation of wall clock time in
poll_timeout_us_atomic. Commit 7349a69cf312 ("iopoll: Do not use
timekeeping in read_poll_timeout_atomic()") changed the behavior to no
longer use ktime_get at the expense of underestimation of wall clock
time which appears to be very large for delay_us=0. Instead of timing
out after approximately XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT microseconds, the timeout
takes XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT * 1000 * (time that the overhead of the for
loop in poll_timeout_us_atomic takes) which is in the range of several
minutes for XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT=1000000. Fix this by using a non-zero
value for delay_us. Use delay_us=10 to keep the delay in the hot path of
starting DMA transfers minimal but still avoid CPU stalls in case of
unexpected hardware failures.
One-off measurement with delay_us=0 causes the cpu to busy wait around 7
minutes in the timeout case. After applying this patch with delay_us=10
the measured timeout was 1053428 microseconds which is roughly
equivalent to the expected 1000000 microseconds specified in
XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT.
Add a constant XILINX_DMA_POLL_DELAY_US for delay_us value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: core - fix rng list on registration error
hwrng_register(rng) does the following:
1. Checks if rng has name and read methods set
2. Checks if the name already exists
3. Adds rng to global rng_list
4. May try to set rng to current_rng
If step 4 fails, it returns an error. However, it does not remove the
rng from rng_list, causing a dangling reference which can result in
use-after-free if the caller frees rng, since registration failed.
Add a list_del_init() cleanup step. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: keembay - Fix AEAD unregister count in error path
register_aes_algs() registers the AEAD algorithms before registering the
skcipher algorithms. If skcipher registration fails, the function unwinds
the earlier AEAD registration with crypto_engine_unregister_aeads(), but it
passes ARRAY_SIZE(algs), which is the skcipher table size.
Use ARRAY_SIZE(algs_aead) for the AEAD unwind path so the unregister helper
iterates over the same table that was registered. Also clarify the nearby
comment: the crypto registration helpers clean up algorithms registered
within the same call, while this function must still unwind earlier
successful registration steps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: Make nr_deadline_tasks an atomic_t
The nr_deadline_tasks variable in the cpuset structure was introduced by
commit 6c24849f5515 ("sched/cpuset: Keep track of SCHED_DEADLINE task
in cpusets"). It is reported by sashiko [1] that nr_deadline_tasks
can currently be modified by inc_dl_tasks_cs() under rq->lock and
by cpuset_attach() under cpuset_mutex. So if both updates happen
simultaneously, the nr_deadline_tasks variable can be corrupted leading
to incorrect operations down the road.
Fix that by changing its type to atomic_t so that nr_deadline_tasks
are always atomically updated. This fix patch is a low hanging fruit.
It can handle some of the races between a concurrent sched_setscheduler()
and cpuset_can_attach()/cpuset_attach() calls, but not all of them like
the other issue raised by sashiko [2]. This will be handled hopefully
in a future follow up patch.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260626181923.133658-1-longman%40redhat.com
[2] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260630033344.352702-1-longman%40redhat.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
time/namespace: Validate nanosecond field in proc_timens_set_offset()
The function validates tv_sec to be within [-KTIME_SEC_MAX, KTIME_SEC_MAX]
but never validates that tv_nsec is within the valid range of
[0, NSEC_PER_SEC-1] before using it in timespec64_add().
timespec64_add() expects both timespec64 structures to have normalized
values with tv_nsec in the range [0, 999999999]. If off->val.tv_nsec
contains invalid values (negative or >= NSEC_PER_SEC), it could lead to
incorrect calculations or unexpected behavior.
Add validation to ensure tv_nsec is within the valid range before
performing the addition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-wmi-base: Fix handling of ultra performance key
The commit message of commit 5fbd827eb9c2 ("platform/x86: dell-wmi: Recognise or support new switches")
states that the ultra performance key contains additional data
after the type and code fields. The event data passed to
dell_wmi_process_key() is already parsed, so "buffer" already
starts after those two fields.
Use the correct index for accessing the first data field to avoid
a potential buffer overread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: lg-laptop: Fix LED resource handling
The event notification callback might access kbd_backlight even
when it was not successfully registered with the LED subsystem.
The same happens inside acpi_remove(), where the LED devices are
unregistered unconditionally.
Fix this by tracking the availability of the kbd_backlight LED
device and use devm_led_classdev_register() to let devres take
care of unregistering the LED devices during removal. For this
the parent device of the LED devices is changed to the native
platform device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject rdonly/rdwr_buf_size kfunc arguments that exceed u32 max
check_kfunc_args() detects a kfunc argument named rdonly_buf_size or
rdwr_buf_size and stores reg->var_off.value into meta->r0_size, a u64,
and does not bound it. check_kfunc_call() later copies that value into
the returned register's mem_size field:
meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value;
...
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size;
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size is u32. A constant whose upper 32 bits are set
gets truncated instead of causing a load-time rejection, so the verifier
records a PTR_TO_MEM register with an approximately 4 GiB mem_size for
whatever allocation the kfunc returned. A later access check against
that register uses the truncated, wrong bound.
Reject rdonly_buf_size/rdwr_buf_size values that exceed U32_MAX at the
point meta->r0_size is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uac: validate rate list length before storing
UAC1 and UAC2 configfs rate-list attributes parse a comma-separated
list of sampling rates and store each parsed value in fixed-size arrays.
The arrays have UAC_MAX_RATES entries, but the store paths do not check
that the input contains at most that many tokens before writing through
opts->name##s[i++].
Writing more than ten rates therefore writes past the end of the
p_srates[] or c_srates[] array in struct f_uac1_opts or struct
f_uac2_opts.
With CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS enabled, writing an 11-entry rate list to the
UAC1 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac1.c:1669:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac1_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
The same reproducer against the UAC2 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c:2087:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac2_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
Reject additional tokens once UAC_MAX_RATES entries have been parsed.
Also keep the original kstrdup() pointer for kfree(), because strsep()
advances the parsing cursor. Freeing the advanced cursor leaks the
original buffer on successful parses and can free an interior pointer on
some error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix resource leaks on probe failure
During driver initialization in asus_wmi_add(), various subsystems are
registered sequentially. However, the error path labels are out of order
relative to the registration sequence.
Specifically:
1. If asus_wmi_custom_fan_curve_init() fails, the driver jumps to
fail_custom_fan_curve. Because this label is placed below fail_sysfs,
it bypasses the cleanup calls for the input device and sysfs groups,
which were successfully registered before, leaking those resources.
2. If asus_screenpad_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_screenpad.
Because fail_screenpad is placed below fail_backlight, it bypasses the
cleanup calls for backlight and rfkill, leaking those resources.
Fix these resource leaks by reordering the error path labels in
asus_wmi_add() to match the exact reverse order of the resource
allocations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()
esp_ssg_unref() releases the page references held on the source
scatterlist after the AEAD operation completes. It calls
skb_page_unref() on every frag page for an out-of-place transform
(req->src != req->dst), and in the error path of esp_output_tail()
(already_unref == true) on the request's own scatterlist.
This is wrong when the skb carries managed frags
(SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS). Managed frags are owned by a zerocopy ubuf
and the skb does not hold a per-frag page reference; io_uring SEND_ZC
with a registered buffer attaches the bvec pages this way via
io_sg_from_iter(). The rest of the stack honours this invariant:
skb_release_data() skips the per-frag unref when SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS
is set, and skb_zcopy_managed() is the guard used at the other unref
sites.
esp_ssg_unref() is missing that guard, so for a managed-frag skb it
drops a page reference the skb never acquired. This can underflow the
page reference count and free a page that is still in use.
Guard the function with skb_zcopy_managed() so both unref paths are
skipped for managed-frag skbs, matching skb_release_data(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rvt: Return NULL after port allocation failure
rvt_alloc_device() deallocates the IB device when its port array cannot
be allocated but then returns the pointer to the released allocation.
Callers treat any non-NULL value as valid and dereference it, resulting
in a use-after-free.
Return NULL immediately after deallocation so callers can propagate the
allocation failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/resctrl: Prevent use-after-free in rdtgroup_kn_put()
A struct rdtgroup is reference counted via rdtgroup::waitcount. Callers that
need the structure to remain valid across a sleep (while waiting on acquiring
rdtgroup_mutex) take a reference with rdtgroup_kn_get() and release it with
rdtgroup_kn_put().
The release path is intended to serve as the fallback freer: if the count
drops to zero and the group has already been marked RDT_DELETED,
rdtgroup_kn_put() frees the structure.
The bulk teardown paths free_all_child_rdtgrp() and rmdir_all_sub() resulting
from a resctrl directory remove or resctrl fs unmount act as the primary
freer: they hold rdtgroup_mutex and free each rdtgroup whose waitcount is
zero, otherwise they set RDT_DELETED and leave the freeing to the last waiter.
These two freers race. rdtgroup_kn_put() commits waitcount == 0 with
atomic_dec_and_test() outside rdtgroup_mutex, then reads rdtgroup::flags.
Between those two operations a concurrent caller of free_all_child_rdtgrp()
or rmdir_all_sub() (which holds the mutex) can observe waitcount == 0 via
atomic_read(), call rdtgroup_remove(), and kfree() the structure.
The subsequent read of rdtgroup::flags in rdtgroup_kn_put() is then
a use-after-free, and the structure may even be freed twice if the freed
memory happens to satisfy the RDT_DELETED flag check.
Replace the bare atomic_dec_and_test() with atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock() so
that the decrement-to-zero takes rdtgroup_mutex before the count becomes
globally visible. The inspection of rdtgroup::flags then runs under the same
mutex held by the bulk freers, making the two paths mutually exclusive.
The common case where the count does not reach zero remains lock-free. Defer
kernfs_unbreak_active_protection() until after the mutex is dropped since
kernfs active protections functionally wrap rdtgroup_mutex. Remove resource
group, which in turn drops its kernfs reference, after kernfs protection is
restored.
[ bp: Split the commit messsages into smaller, easier-parseable paragraphs. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Publish channel state before callbacks
Transport setup can enable callbacks before the setup routine returns.
mailbox_chan_setup() registers the mailbox client with
mbox_request_channel(), and the mailbox controller startup path can enable
interrupt delivery before SCMI mailbox channel state has been published.
Similarly, smc_chan_setup() requests the optional A2P completion IRQ before
the SMC transport has made its cinfo pointer visible.
If a pending or spurious callback fires in those windows, the transport RX
callback can dereference a NULL transport cinfo pointer. Publishing only
the transport-private pointer is not sufficient either: an early callback
can enter the SCMI core before scmi_chan_setup() has assigned
cinfo->handle.
The core derives scmi_info from cinfo->handle in the RX path, so a NULL
handle can still fault even when the transport-private cinfo is valid.
Assign cinfo->handle before invoking the transport setup callback. Publish
the mailbox and SMC transport-private channel state before requesting the
mailbox channels or IRQ, and clear the early-published pointers again on
setup failure. Also unwind mailbox setup devres resources on failure so an
optional RX setup error that is ignored by the core does not leave stale
transport state behind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Unregister device notifier before IDR teardown
The requested-devices notifier looks up protocol fwnodes from the
active_protocols IDR. During remove, unregister the notifier before
releasing and destroying active_protocols so no notifier callback can race
with the IDR teardown.
Keep the bus notifier registered until after the protocol state is torn
down, matching the existing remove ordering for SCMI bus users. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Free transport channel on IDR failure
If transport channel setup succeeds but the following IDR insertion fails,
the error path destroys the transport device and frees the channel info
without invoking the transport cleanup callback.
Call chan_free() before destroying the device so transport specific
resources such as IRQs, mailbox channels and mapped shared memory are
released consistently with the normal teardown path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Avoid IDR updates while cleaning channels
scmi_cleanup_channels() walks the TX/RX channel IDRs with
idr_for_each() to free transport resources and destroy the dedicated
transport devices before calling idr_destroy().
The destroy callback removed each entry from the same IDR being walked.
That is not needed for this cleanup path, and it is unsafe because
idr_for_each() has not advanced its radix-tree iterator while the
callback is running. Removing the current entry from the callback can
invalidate the iterator state. The callback also cannot be protected by
rcu_read_lock(), because scmi_device_destroy() may sleep.
Leave IDR teardown to the following idr_destroy() call and keep the
callback limited to device destruction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Reject out of range DT protocol IDs
SCMI protocol IDs carried in message headers are limited by
MSG_PROTOCOL_ID_MASK. The DT parsing paths noticed protocol IDs
outside that range, but only logged an error and then kept processing
the invalid value.
That lets a malformed 32-bit DT reg value reach helpers which take a u8
protocol ID, where it can be truncated and/or treated as a different
protocol.
For channel setup, two different out-of-range values can also be used as
distinct IDR keys while aliasing the generated SCMI protocol identity.
Skip DT protocol nodes whose reg value does not fit the SCMI protocol ID
field before setting up channels or creating protocol devices. |
