| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: fix manual hash table handle IDR aliasing
A u32 hash table created with an explicit handle ('tc filter add ...
handle 801: u32 divisor N') keys its IDR entry on the raw handle, while
the destroy paths free it under handle2id(handle). The two key domains
disagree for handles in the 0x800..0xFFF htid range:
handle2id() folds them back into the auto-allocated id space (1..0x7FF).
A manual table therefore leaves its raw-keyed IDR entry unreachable on
delete (a permanent leak), and its delete can drop the idr entry of an
unrelated live auto table. A later auto allocation can then hand out a
handle that aliases the live manual table; u32_lookup_ht() first-match
routes lookups and TCA_U32_LINK for that htid to the wrong table.
Key the divisor-path alloc on handle2id(handle) so allocation and
removal share one key domain. A manual handle that maps onto an id
already in use is rejected with -ENOSPC, and auto allocation skips ids
held by live manual tables.
Conditions to recreate:
ip link add test0 type dummy
tc qdisc add dev test0 clsact
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 \
handle 801: u32 divisor 16
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 2 u32 divisor 16
tc -d filter show dev test0 ingress | grep 'fh 801:'
# unpatched: two live tables with handle 0x80100000 (the pref 2 root
# hnode is auto-allocated id 1); patched: the auto hnode takes id 2.
Also tested with a poc with a live u32 table on the block, add/delete a manual
table 'handle 901: u32 divisor 1' twice; unpatched, the re-add fails with
-ENOSPC because the raw key leaked on the first delete. |
| An issue in kamailio v.6.1.1 and before allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the ims_registrar_pcscf module, specifically the pcscf_save_pending/save_pending path and security-agreement parsing in sec_agree.c:parse_sec_agree() |
| Brian Mariani from DigitalCanion SA has discovered a vulnerability in the domain creation functionality of koozali's
SME Server version 11.0rc1-215, allowing an attacker with high privileges
to inject reserved Apache configuration directives, corrupting
httpd.conf and preventing Apache from starting after a server reboot,
resulting in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition affecting the web
server and its hosted virtual hosts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly
Kernel-handled RMPP receive processing starts reassembly for active
DATA responses before the response is matched to an outstanding send.
The normal match happens later, after ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc() has
either assembled a complete message or consumed the segment.
That ordering lets an unsolicited response that routes to a kernel
RMPP agent by the high TID bits allocate or extend RMPP receive state
before the full TID and source address are checked against a real
request. A reordered burst can therefore reach the receive-side
insertion path even though the response would not match any send.
For kernel-handled RMPP DATA responses, require the existing
ib_find_send_mad() match before entering RMPP reassembly. The matcher
already checks the full TID, management class and source address/GID
against the agent wait, backlog and in-flight send lists. If there is
no match, drop the response without creating RMPP state.
This leaves the RMPP window behavior unchanged and only rejects
responses that have no corresponding request. |
| markdown-it is a Markdown parser. Prior to 14.3.3 and 15.0.3, when the html option or commonmark preset is enabled and the constructs occur inside a paragraph, attacker-controlled Markdown containing repeated unterminated inline HTML comments, processing instructions, declarations, or CDATA sections reaches src/rules_inline/html_inline.ts. Its HTML_TAG_RE match searches the remaining suffix for the appropriate terminator; when no terminator is present, parsing advances to the next opener and repeats the match over overlapping input, causing quadratic processing and denial of service through event-loop blocking or an unresponsive browser main thread. HTML blocks and the default HTML-disabled configuration are not affected by these payloads. This issue is fixed in versions 14.3.3 and 15.0.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: fix Rx queue stall on alloc failure
When the system is under extreme memory pressure, page allocations can
fail during the Rx buffer refill loop. If the number of buffers posted
to hardware falls below a critical low threshold and the refill loop
exits due to allocation failures, the queue can stall:
1. The device drops incoming packets because there are no descriptors.
2. Since no packets are processed, no Rx completions are generated.
3. Because no completions occur, NAPI is never scheduled, preventing
the refill loop from running again even after memory is freed.
This results in a permanent queue stall.
Resolve this by introducing a starvation recovery timer for each Rx queue.
If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low
threshold, start a timer to periodically reschedule NAPI. Once NAPI runs
and successfully refills the queue above the threshold, the timer is
not rescheduled.
The threshold is set to 32 because a single maximum-sized Receive Segment
Coalescing (RSC) packet can consume up to 19 descriptors in the Rx path.
Lower thresholds (such as 8 or 16) would be insufficient to process a
complete maximum-sized RSC packet, risking packet drops or unexpected
hardware behavior under memory pressure. Setting the threshold to 32
guarantees a safe margin to handle at least one full RSC packet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mld: stop TX during firmware restart
When iwlwifi firmware crashes (e.g., NMI_INTERRUPT_UNKNOWN on Intel
BE201/Wi-Fi 7), iwl_mld_nic_error() sets mld->fw_status.in_hw_restart
to true. However, iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() does not check this flag before
dequeuing frames from mac80211 and pushing them to the transport layer.
Since the firmware is dead, iwl_trans_tx() returns -EIO for each frame,
which then gets freed immediately. Under high-throughput conditions
(e.g., Tailscale UDP traffic or active SSH sessions), this creates a
tight dequeue-send-fail-free loop that wastes CPU cycles and generates
rapid skb allocation churn, leading to memory pressure from slab
fragmentation.
The RX path already has this guard (iwl_mld_rx_mpdu checks
in_hw_restart at rx.c:1906), and so does the TXQ allocation worker
(iwl_mld_add_txqs_wk at tx.c:156). Add the same guard to
iwl_mld_tx_from_txq() to stop all TX during firmware restart.
Frames left in mac80211's TXQs are naturally drained after restart
completes, when queue reallocation triggers iwl_mld_tx_from_txq()
via iwl_mld_add_txq_list(), or when new upper-layer traffic invokes
wake_tx_queue.
Tested on ASUS Zenbook 14 UX3405CA with Intel BE201 (Wi-Fi 7) on
kernel 6.19.5 where the firmware crashes approximately every 10-15
minutes under Tailscale traffic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Run queues for all non-SDEV_DEL devices from scsi_run_host_queues
While a SCSI host is in a recovery state, scsi_mq_requeue_cmd() will not
set the requeue list for a requeued command to be kicked in the future.
The expectation is a call to scsi_run_host_queues() will kick all SCSI
devices once the recovery state is cleared.
However, scsi_run_host_queues() uses shost_for_each_device() which uses
scsi_device_get() and so will ignore devices in a partially removed
state like SDEV_CANCEL. But these devices may also have requeued
requests, leaving their requests stuck from not being kicked and causing
the removal process of the device to hang.
scsi_run_host_queues() needs to run against more devices than the macro
shost_for_each_device() allows. Instead of using the too limiting
scsi_device_get() state checks, only ignore devices in SDEV_DEL state or
when unable to acquire a reference. Attempt to run the queues for all
other devices when scsi_run_host_queues() is called. |
| markdown-it is a Markdown parser. Prior to 14.3.2 and 15.0.2, when typographer: true is enabled, specially crafted Markdown can cause quadratic processing time in the smartquotes rule, potentially leading to denial of service in applications processing untrusted input. Many opening double quotes followed by unmatched closing single quotes cause repeated scans of the entire opener stack. The same issue occurs with the quote types reversed. The default configuration (typographer: false) is not affected, but this option is enabled with high probability. This issue is fixed in versions 14.3.2 and 15.0.2. |
| undici is an HTTP client library for Node.js. In versions 5.15.0 through 6.29.0, 7.0.0 through 7.30.0, and 8.0.0 through 8.12.1, its WebSocket client, including the bundled WebSocket exposed by Node.js, can be driven to exhaust process memory by a malicious or compromised WebSocket server. For every PING frame received, the client automatically writes a PONG response and ignores the backpressure signal from the socket write, so a server that streams small PING frames while never reading the client's PONGs makes the outbound write queue and heap grow without bound until the Node.js process runs out of memory and terminates. The attack is remote and unauthenticated, needs only a normal WebSocket connection, and is asymmetric, since small inbound PINGs produce a much larger retained outbound queue, with availability the only impact. The issue is fixed in undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, and 8.12.2, which pause WebSocket frame parsing when the automatic PONG response hits socket backpressure and resume on drain, bounding the outbound queue, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. There is no workaround. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, add_vhost/2 calls rabbit_data_coercion:atomize_keys/1 (the unsafe variant using binary_to_atom) on the vhost metadata map. The 20 MB management body limit fits ~1M+ short keys. Admin-only. An administrator importing a crafted definitions file can crash the node in a single request: a vhosts entry with ~1M unique metadata keys exhausts the atom table during import. Preconditions include administrator tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0, When a binding is created on an x-jms-topic exchange, add_binding/3 reads the rjms_erlang_selector argument and passes it through erl_scan:string/1 then erl_parse:parse_term/1. erl_scan:string/1 interns every atom literal it tokenizes. validate_binding/2 is a no-op (-> ok.), there is no length cap, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms. The Java JMS client compiles selectors client-side, but the server does not enforce this , a raw AMQP client can send arbitrary selector strings. An authenticated low-privilege AMQP user confined to one vhost can crash the entire broker node (cross-tenant DoS) in <100 bind calls. Preconditions include rabbitmq_jms_topic_exchange plugin enabled (bundled; required for any JMS deployment) Authenticated AMQP user with read on an x-jms-topic exchange + write on a queue (or configure to declare both). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0. |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1, get_chunk_selector/1 calls binary_to_atom on the raw client-supplied <<"chunk_selector">> property from post-auth subscribe and resolve_offset_spec frames, with no whitelist and no existing guard. An authenticated stream client with read access to any stream can crash the broker node. Preconditions include rabbitmq_stream plugin enabled Authenticated stream-protocol user with read access to at least one stream. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Replace guest-triggerable BUG_ON() in ioeventfd datamatch with get_unaligned()
Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back
in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned
accesses.
For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the
destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory,
and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM
handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page
offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining
bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with
appropriate offsets).
If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second
page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the
MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd
at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the
store as a potential ioeventfd signal.
Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page
starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled
ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using
&dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being
32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires.
E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8,
all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON()
fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm]
kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm]
vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm]
emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm]
emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf
</TASK>
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM
x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0.
Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice,
dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C,
e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: allow subflow rcv wnd to shrink
In MPTCP connection, the `window` field in the TCP header refers to the
MPTCP-level rcv_nxt and it's right edge should not move backward. Such
constraint is enforced at DSS option generation time.
At the same time, the TCP stack ensures independently that the TCP-level
rcv wnd right's edge does not move backward. That in turn causes artificial
inflating of the MPTCP rcv window when the incoming data is acked at the
TCP level and is OoO in the MPTCP sequence space (or lands in the backlog).
As a consequence, the incoming traffic can exceed the receiver rcvbuf size
even when the sender is not misbehaving.
Prevent such scenario forcibly allowing the TCP subflow to shrink the
TCP-level rcv wnd regardless of the current netns setting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue
virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() checks vvs->rx_bytes + len > vvs->buf_alloc.
virtio_transport_recv_enqueue() skips coalescing for packets
with VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM.
If fed with packets with len == 0 and VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM,
a very large number of packets can be queued
because vvs->rx_bytes stays at 0.
Fix this by estimating the skb metadata size:
(Number of skbs in the queue) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conncount: increase the connection clean up limit to 64
After the optimization to only perform one GC per jiffy, a new problem
was introduced. If more than 8 new connections are tracked per jiffy the
list won't be cleaned up fast enough possibly reaching the limit
wrongly.
In order to prevent this issue, only skip the GC if it was already
triggered during the same jiffy and the increment is lower than the
clean up limit. In addition, increase the clean up limit to 64
connections to avoid triggering GC too often and do more effective GCs.
This has been tested using a HTTP server and several
performance tools while having nft_connlimit/xt_connlimit or OVS limit
configured.
Output of slowhttptest + OVS limit at 52000 connections:
slow HTTP test status on 340th second:
initializing: 0
pending: 432
connected: 51998
error: 0
closed: 0
service available: YES |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: replace overzealous BUG_ON in osdmap_apply_incremental()
If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the incremental
osdmap epoch is different from what is expected, there is no need to
BUG. Instead, just declare the incremental osdmap to be invalid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue
skbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region,
[1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field.
[2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is
enabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace
via sock_recv_errqueue() -> put_cmsg().
The crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone()
(from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1]
2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone
[3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp
reporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr->ee from skb->cb
[4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no
usercopy whitelist [5]
When cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the
socket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb->cb
via put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation:
[ 5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_fclone_cache' (offset 296, size 16)!
[ 5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
[ 5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7
[ 5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80
[ 5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff <0f> 0b 490
[ 5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74
[ 5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0
[ 5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74
[ 5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00
[ 5.384903] FS: 0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5.384903] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 5.384903] PKRU: 55555554
[ 5.384903] Call Trace:
[ 5.384903] <TASK>
[ 5.384903] __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0
[ 5.384903] __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690
[ 5.384903] put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0
[ 5.384903] sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380
[ 5.384903] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960
[ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5.384903] ? schedule+0x6d/0x270
[ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5.384903] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[ 5.384903] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[ 5.384903] ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10
[ 5.384903] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0
[ 5.384903] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40
[ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
The crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2->cb within skbuff_fclones:
- sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 -
offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 =
272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee)
This patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure.
[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491
[5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-verity: disable recursive forward error correction
There are two problems with the recursive correction:
1. It may cause denial-of-service. In fec_read_bufs, there is a loop that
has 253 iterations. For each iteration, we may call verity_hash_for_block
recursively. There is a limit of 4 nested recursions - that means that
there may be at most 253^4 (4 billion) iterations. Red Hat QE team
actually created an image that pushes dm-verity to this limit - and this
image just makes the udev-worker process get stuck in the 'D' state.
2. It doesn't work. In fec_read_bufs we store data into the variable
"fio->bufs", but fio bufs is shared between recursive invocations, if
"verity_hash_for_block" invoked correction recursively, it would
overwrite partially filled fio->bufs. |
