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Search Results (11632 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74485 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that same delimiter: memset(buf + count, del, 8); Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan. If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is not a flag character. For example registering PaPEPPxPPiP with 'P' as the delimiter (name "a", type extension, magic "x", interpreter "i", empty flags) leaves the flag scan running off the end of the buffer. The registration is rejected in the end because the parser does not stop exactly at buf + count, but only after the out of bounds read has already happened. With an unlucky allocation layout the scan can walk into an unmapped page; under KASAN it is reported as a slab out of bounds read. binfmt_misc mounts are available to unprivileged users in a user namespace so the read is reachable without privileges. Reject a delimiter that is one of the flag characters up front. Such a registration was always rejected anyway, only after the out of bounds read, so no valid registration string changes meaning. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74476 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: veth: convert frag_list skbs before running XDP A frag_list skb can reach veth with data_len set but nr_frags zero. veth_convert_skb_to_xdp_buff() only converts skbs that are shared, locked, have frags[], or do not have enough headroom. It later uses skb_is_nonlinear() to decide whether to set XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS and xdp_frags_size. That exposes frag_list data to XDP as if it were stored in frags[], but frags[] is empty. AF_XDP copy mode can then trust the bogus XDP fragment metadata, walk an empty fragment entry, and crash in memcpy() from __xsk_rcv(). Route non-linear skbs through skb_pp_cow_data() before exposing them to XDP, and only advertise XDP frags when the resulting skb has frags[]. skb_copy_bits() already handles frag_list input, and skb_pp_cow_data() builds frags[] output with skb_add_rx_frag(), which is the representation XDP multi-buffer expects. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74474 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() for transmit path header pulls In vxlan_xmit(), arp_reduce(), and vxlan_mdb_entry_skb_get(), pskb_may_pull() was being called to verify the availability of network layer headers (ARP, IPv6/ND, IP/IPv6 MDB keys). However, during transmit skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, len) only checks len bytes from skb->data rather than skb_network_offset(skb) + len, which can leave part of the network header in non-linear frags. Replace these remaining pskb_may_pull() calls with pskb_network_may_pull() to properly account for the MAC header offset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74473 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit() route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74444 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division vmw_cmd_draw() computes maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl); where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum. Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory. Reject undersized headers up front. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74410 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw88: fix OOB read from firmware RX descriptor exceeding DMA buffer In rtw_pci_rx_napi(), new_len is computed as the sum of pkt_len (14-bit descriptor field, max 16383) and pkt_offset (drv_info_sz + shift, both firmware-controlled). The result can exceed RTK_PCI_RX_BUF_SIZE (11478), causing an out-of-bounds read from the pre-allocated DMA buffer when skb_put_data copies new_len bytes. The USB transport already validates this (rtw_usb_rx_data_put checks against RTW_USB_MAX_RECVBUF_SZ); the PCIe path does not. Add a check that new_len does not exceed the DMA buffer size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74409 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw89: add bounds check on firmware mac_id in link lookup The mac_id field in RX descriptors is 8 bits wide (0-255), but assoc_link_on_macid[] has only RTW89_MAX_MAC_ID_NUM (128) entries. While the driver currently assigns mac_id values below 128, the descriptor value comes from firmware and is not validated before use as an array index. Add a defensive bounds check in rtw89_assoc_link_rcu_dereference() to guard against out-of-range firmware values. | ||||
| CVE-2024-58397 | 1 Mp4v2 | 1 Mp4v2 | 2026-10-16 | 6.1 Medium |
| MP4v2 through 2.1.3 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read in MP4File::GetChapters() that allows attackers to read past heap allocations via crafted QuickTime chapter samples. Attackers can supply an MP4 file whose chapter sample is shorter than its declared title length, crashing applications like mp4chaps or leaking adjacent heap memory into chapter titles. | ||||
| CVE-2026-83733 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Print Spooler Components allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-85808 | 1 Microsoft | 22 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 19 more | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS) allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79607 | 1 Xen | 1 Xen | 2026-10-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| During Xenstore live update the state record for a Xenstore watch with specified watch depth is written with two bytes missing. This results in an inconsistent state when reading the state back in the new Xenstore, causing a crash of Xenstore or wrong Xenstore data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74340 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wcn36xx: fix OOB read from firmware count in PRINT_REG_INFO indication The firmware-controlled rsp->count field is used as the loop bound for indexing into the flexible rsp->regs[] array without validation against the message length. A count exceeding the actual data causes out-of- bounds reads from the heap-allocated message buffer. Add a check that count fits within the received message. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74287 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate embedded address parameter length sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP, and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header, but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length fits within the bounds of the outer parameter. Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the embedded address parameter and pass it to af->from_addr_param(), which uses the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload. A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter. Validate that addr_param->p.length does not exceed the space available after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds. This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried in INIT or ASCONF processing paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72478 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: add bounds check to run_get_highest_vcn() run_get_highest_vcn() parses a packed NTFS mapping-pairs buffer without any length bound, relying solely on a 0x00 terminator to stop. A crafted $LogFile UpdateMappingPairs record whose embedded attribute contains mapping-pairs runs without a terminator causes the function to read past the slab allocation, triggering a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read on mount. The sibling function run_unpack() received an analogous bounds-check in commit b62567bca474 ("ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()"), but run_get_highest_vcn() was missed. Take a run_buf_size parameter and reject any run header whose payload would extend past the buffer end, mirroring the pattern used by run_unpack(). The caller in fslog.c passes the remaining attribute bytes after the mapping-pairs offset. KASAN report (on mainline v7.1 merge window HEAD): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e2d5400 by task mount/72 Call Trace: run_get_highest_vcn+0x3c0/0x410 do_action.isra.0+0x3ba8/0x7b50 log_replay+0x9ddd/0x10200 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x4ad/0x610 ntfs_fill_super+0x214a/0x4540 | ||||
| CVE-2026-72466 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xprtrdma: Fix bcall rep leak and unbounded peek rpcrdma_is_bcall() decodes a reply's first words to decide whether the frame is a backchannel call. Two issues in that decode path let a short or malformed reply leak the receive buffer and drain the Receive queue. First, the speculative peek p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 0); /* five p++ reads follow */ asks xdr_inline_decode() for zero bytes, which returns xdr->p without consulting xdr->end. The five subsequent __be32 reads can then walk up to 20 bytes past the wire payload into stale regbuf contents and misclassify the reply as a backchannel call. Second, after the post-peek p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 3 * sizeof(*p)); if (unlikely(!p)) return true; the short-header arm returns true without calling rpcrdma_bc_receive_call(). The contract with the caller is that a true return transfers ownership of rep to the backchannel path: rpcrdma_reply_handler() if (rpcrdma_is_bcall(r_xprt, rep)) return; /* bare return, skips out_post */ ... out_post: rpcrdma_post_recvs(r_xprt, credits + ...); Because rpcrdma_bc_receive_call() never ran, no one took rep, but rpcrdma_reply_handler still bare-returns past rpcrdma_rep_put() and rpcrdma_post_recvs(). The rep, with its persistently DMA-mapped receive buffer, is orphaned on rb_all_reps and freed only at transport teardown. This completion reposts nothing, so its slot is reclaimed only when a later forward-channel reply reaches out_post and rpcrdma_post_recvs() allocates a fresh rep to backfill; absent that traffic the Receive queue drains and the peer's Sends draw RNR NAKs. Fix by consulting xdr->end after the zero-length peek so the five __be32 reads cannot run unless 20 bytes of wire payload remain. A byte-precise comparison against xdr->end is required because a non-4-aligned receive rounds the stream's word count up past the true payload. Also return false from the short-header arm so the reply falls through the normal out_norqst cleanup chain (rpcrdma_rep_put() plus rpcrdma_post_recvs()). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72419 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_nat: avoid invalid nat_net pointer use on failed nf_nat_init() We ran into below KASAN splat, which is mostly uninteresting, beside for having nf_nat_register_fn() in the call chain as a cause for the offending access: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 Read of size 8 at addr ffff890031e54c20 by task iptables/9510 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9510 Comm: iptables Not tainted 6.18.18-grsec-full-20260320181326 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> […] dump_stack_lvl+0xee/0x160 ffff88004117eeb8 […] print_report+0x6e/0x640 ffff88004117eee0 […] ? __phys_addr+0x8e/0x140 ffff88004117eef0 […] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x51/0xe0 ffff88004117ef08 […] ? complete_report_info+0xec/0x1c0 ffff88004117ef20 […] ? nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 ffff88004117ef48 […] kasan_report+0xbc/0x140 ffff88004117ef50 […] ? nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 ffff88004117ef90 […] nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640 ffff88004117eff8 […] ? nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation+0x6e0/0x6e0 ffff88004117f070 […] nf_tables_register_hook.part.0+0xa0/0x220 ffff88004117f080 […] nf_tables_addchain.constprop.0+0x1054/0x1fc0 ffff88004117f0b8 […] ? nft_chain_lookup.part.0+0x4ce/0xac0 ffff88004117f130 […] ? nf_tables_abort+0x3d80/0x3d80 ffff88004117f190 […] ? nf_tables_dumpreset_obj+0x100/0x100 ffff88004117f1c8 […] ? nft_table_lookup.part.0+0x255/0x300 ffff88004117f310 […] ? nf_tables_newchain+0x21a4/0x2fa0 ffff88004117f358 […] nf_tables_newchain+0x21a4/0x2fa0 ffff88004117f360 […] ? nf_tables_addchain.constprop.0+0x1fc0/0x1fc0 ffff88004117f458 […] ? nla_get_range_signed+0x4a0/0x4a0 ffff88004117f488 […] ? lock_acquire+0x16f/0x320 ffff88004117f490 […] ? find_held_lock+0x3b/0xe0 ffff88004117f4b0 […] ? __nla_parse+0x45/0x80 ffff88004117f500 […] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbca/0x19a0 ffff88004117f550 […] ? nfnetlink_net_exit_batch+0x120/0x120 ffff88004117f618 […] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x63/0xe0 ffff88004117f720 […] ? gr_acl_handle_mmap+0x1c4/0x320 ffff88004117f7c0 […] ? nla_get_range_signed+0x4a0/0x4a0 ffff88004117f7e8 […] ? gr_is_capable+0x6f/0xe0 ffff88004117f830 […] ? __nla_parse+0x45/0x80 ffff88004117f860 […] ? skb_pull+0x103/0x1a0 ffff88004117f880 […] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3db/0x4a0 ffff88004117f8b0 […] ? nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x19a0/0x19a0 ffff88004117f8d8 […] ? netlink_lookup+0xe2/0x240 ffff88004117f900 […] netlink_unicast+0x74b/0xb00 ffff88004117f930 […] ? netlink_attachskb+0xb20/0xb20 ffff88004117f980 […] ? __check_object_size+0x3e/0xaa0 ffff88004117f998 […] ? security_netlink_send+0x51/0x160 ffff88004117f9c8 […] netlink_sendmsg+0xa03/0x1200 ffff88004117f9f8 […] ? netlink_unicast+0xb00/0xb00 ffff88004117fa70 […] ? netlink_unicast+0xb00/0xb00 ffff88004117fac8 […] ? ____sys_sendmsg+0xe2a/0x1040 ffff88004117faf8 […] ____sys_sendmsg+0xe2a/0x1040 ffff88004117fb00 […] ? kernel_recvmsg+0x300/0x300 ffff88004117fb60 […] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xe9/0x260 ffff88004117fbc8 […] ___sys_sendmsg+0x138/0x200 ffff88004117fbf8 […] ? do_recvmmsg+0x7e0/0x7e0 ffff88004117fc30 […] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x101/0x1e0 ffff88004117fc50 […] ? lock_acquire+0x16f/0x320 ffff88004117fd20 […] ? lock_acquire+0x16f/0x320 ffff88004117fd58 […] ? find_held_lock+0x3b/0xe0 ffff88004117fd70 […] __sys_sendmsg+0x17a/0x260 ffff88004117fdc8 […] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x80/0x80 ffff88004117fdf0 […] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x15e/0x2c0 ffff88004117fe98 […] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x400 ffff88004117fec8 […] entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack+0x4a/0x60 ffff88004117fef8 </TASK> ================================================================== The out-of-bounds report, though, is a red herring as it is f ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-72415 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SDCA: Validate written enum value in ge_put_enum_double() ge_put_enum_double() passes the user-supplied enumeration index item[0] to snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() without checking it against the number of items in the enum: ret = snd_soc_enum_item_to_val(e, item[0]); snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() indexes the heap-allocated e->values[] array with that index (e->values is set from a devm_kcalloc() of e->items entries), so a control write with an out-of-range item[0] reads past the end of the values buffer. The bounds check in snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double() only runs afterwards, so it does not prevent the read here. Reject an out-of-range item before using it, matching the other enum put handlers. This issue was pointed out by the Sashiko AI review bot while reviewing a related enum-validation series: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260609125735.CEB651F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ | ||||
| CVE-2026-72400 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields. The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer. Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108129 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-16 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72310 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace. The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length. A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer. Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as out of bounds. | ||||